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REGULATING WHAT’S NOT REAL: FEDERAL REGULATION IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION 
No calamity so touches the common heart of humanity as does the straying of a 
little child.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pornographic images created using real children raise serious concerns 
about the sexual exploitation of children.  Tragically, pedophiles and child 
molesters prey on young children by using them to create images that “feed 
their sexual obsessions, . . . stimulate their sex drive and validate their desire to 
actually assault children.”2  Philip Jenkins, author of Beyond Tolerance, 
recounts the following painful and disturbing story of a young female victim: 
[A] British girl . . . , tragically, may be one of the best-known sex stars on the 
Web.  In the late 1980s, as a little girl of seven or eight, [she] became the 
subject of a photo series that depicted her not only in all the familiar nude 
poses of hard-core pornography but also showed her in numerous sex acts with 
[a young boy] of about the same age.  Both are shown having sex with an adult 
man, presumably [the young girl’s] father. . . . [These images] are cherished by 
thousands of collectors worldwide.  They seem to be the standard starter kit for 
child porn novices.3 
It should be no surprise that a child’s participation in the production of 
such images severely impacts that child’s psychological well-being.4  There is 
ample evidence to suggest that children used in the production of such images 
struggle to develop healthy relationships as adults, endure sexual dysfunction, 
have a tendency to become sexual abusers themselves, and engage in drug and 
alcohol abuse, prostitution, or other self-destructive behavior later in life.5  The 
premature introduction of sexuality to a child might result in a lasting 
unhealthy emotional reaction to normal sexual experiences.6  In addition, “the 
 
 1. William Sydney Porter. 
 2. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, advertisement, In the Case of Child 
Pornography, the More Underdeveloped the Better the Picture (2003), available at 
www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/Ad_Underdeveloped_8.5x11.pdf. 
 3. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 2 
(2001). 
 4. S. REP. NO. 95-438, pt. IV(C), at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 46. 
 5. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982). 
 6. ANN WOLBERT BURGESS, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RINGS 111 (1984) (“[T]he 
child might perform physiologically but not respond emotionally.  In such a case the sexual 
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child may be programmed to use sex to acquire recognition, attention, and 
validation . . . [and] the child may learn that sex is something basically 
improper that needs to be cloaked in secrecy.”7  Further, the impact of the 
abuse is not limited to the actual experience; a child victim who bravely 
discloses the experience to family or authorities finds him or herself reliving 
the stress and anxiety of the experience before and during disclosure.8 
To add further pain to the inevitable psychological injury resulting from a 
child victim’s participation in the creation of child pornography, these victims 
are left with “a permanent record of [their] participation and the harm to the 
child is exacerbated by [the materials’] circulation.”9 
Before society’s relatively recent technology boom and the resulting 
widespread use of the Internet, child pornographers were limited to using real 
children to create their material.  Today, unfortunately, technological advances 
have given child pornographers a new set of tools for the development of 
pornographic images that depict children in sexually explicit ways.  Some say 
that computers have “emancipated pedophiles from having to exploit and 
abuse real children.”10  Further, the computer and the Internet have become the 
nearly-exclusive means by which child pornography is viewed and exchanged 
by other child pornographers and child molesters.11  As one commentator 
noted: 
[C]hild porn is extremely difficult to obtain through non-electronic means and 
has been so for twenty years . . . . It is a substantial presence, and much of the 
material [on the Internet] is worse than most of us can imagine, in terms of the 
types of activity depicted and the ages of the children portrayed.12 
One unfortunate result of society’s technology boom and widespread use 
of the Internet is the introduction of virtual child pornography to the child 
pornographer’s production capabilities.  Virtual child pornography involves 
methods by which computer-savvy child pornographers use technology to 
create computer-generated images of children that look real and, even more 
frighteningly, to disguise images of real children so that they appear computer-
 
activity either becomes the only mode of emotional expression or becomes separated and isolated 
from emotion.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See generally id. at 112-20. 
 9. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
 10. Adam J. Wasserman, Virtual Child.Porn.Com: Defending the Constitutionality of the 
Criminalization of Computer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996—A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
245, 246 (1998). 
 11. See JENKINS, supra note 3, at 9. 
 12. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] REGULATING WHAT’S NOT REAL 1065 
generated.13  For example, child pornographers and pedophiles can use 3-D 
modeling programs to create images of children that are indistinguishable from 
real children.14  In addition, innocent pictures of actual children can be altered 
by inexpensive graphics programs to create a sexually explicit image of the 
same child.15 
These technological advances and the resulting introduction of virtual child 
pornography have muddled the already murky landscape of child pornography 
regulation and have challenged courts and Congress to more precisely define 
what images fall outside the boundaries of protected speech under the First 
Amendment.  On April 16, 2002, the Supreme Court rejected Congress’s first 
attempt to regulate virtual child pornography in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition.16  In this case, the Court faced a challenge to sections of the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) and held that it was “overbroad 
and unconstitutional,”17 stressing that the CPPA prohibited speech that might 
have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”18  The Court 
emphasized that the “CPPA prohibit[ed] speech that records no crime and 
creates no victims by its production.”19  Further, the Court held that otherwise-
protected speech cannot be suppressed simply because it might be used for 
criminal acts in the future.20 
The Free Speech Coalition decision has been interpreted as marking the 
Court’s rejection of a complete ban on virtual child pornography.21  Further, 
the decision appears to protect the production of non-obscene, computer-
 
 13. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. § 2(5) (2002).  This practice has contributed to allegedly 
impossible prosecutorial proof hurdles.  See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. 
 14. See H.R. 4623 § 2(5). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 17. Id. at 258. 
 18. Id. at 246 (“The CPPA prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”). 
 19. Id. at 250. 
 20. Id.; see also Freedom of Speech and Expression, 116 HARV. L. REV. 262, 266 (2002). 
 21. Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 and the Sex Tourism 
Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4623 and H.R. 4477 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. 4 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4623] (statement of Daniel P. Collins, 
Associate Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice) (“[T]he Court concluded . . . that New York v. Ferber, the leading Supreme Court case 
that allows the criminalization of child pornography, could not be extended to support a complete 
ban on virtual child pornography . . . .”); see also Freedom of Speech and Expression, supra note 
20, at 269 (“The Court’s construction of the CPPA is yet another indication of its increasing 
distrust of categorical, value-based exclusions from First Amendment protection.”). 
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generated images of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct so long as 
no actual child was used in the production of the image.22 
This result is understandably unsettling to those who cannot fathom a 
scenario in which an image (virtual or not) of a child engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct has social, literary, artistic, or scientific value.23  On the other 
hand, those who support the Free Speech Coalition decision applaud the Court 
for rejecting what was perceived to be an unconstitutional, overly broad 
regulation of speech.24  While supporters of the decision concede that certain 
categories of expression, including child pornography, are beyond the 
protection of the First Amendment because of their “slight social value,”25 they 
argue that, if Congress must regulate virtual child pornography, it must do so 
in a manner that does not inadvertently silence speech that would otherwise be 
protected by the First Amendment.26 
Congress has struggled to draft legislation that both captures the truly 
objectionable virtual child pornography and stays within the boundaries of the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  For example, in Free Speech 
Coalition, the Court held that one of the major flaws in the CPPA was 
Congress’s failure to define precisely what harm results from virtual child 
pornography when no actual child is used to create the sexually explicit 
image.27  The Government argued that virtual child pornography fuels the 
 
 22. Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) [hereinafter 
Enhancing Child Protection Laws] (statement of Va. Robert C. Scott, Member, House Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security). 
 23. See Rikki Solowey, Comment, A Question of Equivalence: Expanding the Definition of 
Child Pornography to Encompass “Virtual” Computer-Generated Images, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 161, 200 (2002) (“Failing to prohibit virtual pornographic images of children 
would be sending the wrong message to society . . . . Permitting such images to be legally 
available gives molesters the false idea that this can be done to children.”). 
 24. See Aimee G. Hamoy, Comment, The Constitutionality of Virtual Child Pornography: 
Why Reality and Fantasy Are Still Different Under the First Amendment, 12 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 471, 517 (2002) (concluding that “prohibiting Congress from criminalizing virtual fantasies 
and the imaginations of sophisticated computer users remains consistent with both the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the area of child pornography and the First Amendment”). 
 25. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that “[t]here 
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”); see generally Freedom of 
Speech and Expression, supra note 20, at 268 (explaining that these other categories include 
obscenity, profanity, libel, fighting words, and commercial speech). 
 26. As the Free Speech Coalition argued against the CPPA, “the government’s interest in 
protecting children does not justify reducing the entire adult population to reading and viewing 
only what is fit for children.”  Respondent’s Brief at 15, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 
U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-795). 
 27. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250. 
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proliferation of the child pornography market and emphasized the negative 
secondary effects that virtual child pornography might have on subsequent 
viewers of the material.28  This argument was flatly rejected by the majority in 
Free Speech Coalition, which held that “[v]irtual child pornography is not 
‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children . . . . [T]he causal link 
[between virtual child pornography images and actual instances of child abuse] 
is contingent and indirect.”29  Without such a causal link between speech and 
its resulting harm, the Court said, the Government may not suppress speech 
simply because it may “encourage” pedophiles and molesters to abuse 
children.30 
In the wake of the Free Speech Coalition decision, both the House and 
Senate have made new attempts to draft legislation that targets the evils 
associated with virtual child pornography.31  Determined to ensure the 
effective enforcement of established child pornography laws, Congress has 
enacted legislation in response to—and, as this Note will consider, potentially 
consistent with—the Free Speech Coalition decision.  On April 30, 2003, 
President George W. Bush signed into law the Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 
(PROTECT Act 2003).32  Whatever the fate might be for the PROTECT Act 
2003, Congress has made notable progress in crafting legislation that respects 
the free speech guarantees embodied in the First Amendment, while targeting 
the specific evils associated with virtual child pornography. 
As background to the PROTECT Act 2003, this Note will provide a brief 
survey of the Supreme Court’s obscenity and child pornography jurisprudence, 
including Miller v. California and New York v. Ferber and will briefly outline 
the unchallenged federal criminalization of child pornography that is created 
by using real children. 
 
 28. Petitioner’s Brief at 14, Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S 234 (No. 00-795).  See 
Solowey, supra note 23, at 181 (explaining that child pornography, both real and virtual, is often 
used by pedophiles as a means to instruct their child victims on how to engage in sexual behavior, 
as a way to break children down and trick them into feeling more comfortable about engaging in 
the sexual behavior, and also as a pseudo-currency with which to exchange child pornography 
with fellow pedophiles, leading to the intolerable result of a thriving child pornography market).  
The secondary effects and market proliferation theories were relied upon greatly by the 
Government in Free Speech Coalition to support upholding the CPPA.  See Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 251-54. 
 29. Id. at 250. 
 30. Id. at 253-54. 
 31. See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 1161, 108th 
Cong. (2003); S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).  See generally Enhancing Child Protection 
Laws, supra note 22, at 3 (statement of Tx. Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security) (“The elimination of child pornography in all forms and the 
protection of children from sexual exploitation should be one of Congress’s highest priorities.”). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
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Next, this Note will trace Congress’s past attempts to regulate child 
pornography, including the CPPA, and will explore the reasons behind the 
Court’s rejection of the CPPA’s virtual child pornography provisions in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. 
Finally, this Note will highlight key provisions of the PROTECT Act 2003 
and will analyze how the Act conforms to or deviates from the guidelines set 
forth in the Free Speech Coalition decision with respect to the following 
categories: (1) the definition of virtual child pornography; (2) the 
criminalization of pandering and solicitation of virtual child pornography, and 
(3) the affirmative defense. 
II.  OBSCENITY AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY—LEADING CASES 
A. Miller v. California 
In Miller v. California, the Court tightened up the then unworkably-loose 
definition of obscenity.33  In Miller, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
longstanding view that obscene material is not protected by the First 
Amendment.34  Precisely defining obscenity, however, proved to be more 
difficult for the Court.  In this landmark decision, the Court provided the 
following three-prong test for determining whether something is obscene: 
(a) [W]hether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable . . . law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.35 
 
 33. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) (5-4 decision) (noting that “no majority of 
the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes 
obscene, pornographic material”).  Before Miller, Justice Burger noted, the Court had assumed 
“the role of an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each 
piece of material brought before us.”  Id. at 22 n.3. 
 34. Id. at 23; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding 
that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include 
the lewd and obscene . . . .”).  In Miller, the appellant was convicted of violating a California 
statute that prohibited “knowingly distributing obscene matter.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.  The 
appellant, in a mass-mailing, advertised books containing sexually explicit material.  The 
advertisements contained “very explicit[]” depictions of men and women engaging in sexual 
activity.  Id. at 17-18. 
 35. Id. at 24 (citation omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).  
This decision flatly rejected the Court’s earlier obscenity test articulated in A Book Named ‘John 
Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure’ v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).  The 
standard in Memoirs required the Court to find “that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken 
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it 
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Whether something appeals to the “prurient interest” or is “patently offensive” 
is a question of fact and must be determined based on the standards of the 
particular community.36  The Court rejected the implementation of national 
standards, noting that such standards would ultimately prove “hypothetical and 
unascertainable.”37  The majority in Miller emphasized that “[t]he First 
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a 
majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent.”38 
B. New York v. Ferber 
Nine years after the Court decided Miller, the Court decided New York v. 
Ferber, the leading case on the regulation of child pornography involving the 
use of real children in its production.39  At issue in Ferber was the 
constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited the promotion and 
distribution of material that depicted a child younger than sixteen engaging in a 
sexual performance.40  Holding that “[s]tates are entitled to greater leeway in 
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children,”41 the Court found that: 
(1) there is a compelling governmental interest in “‘safeguarding the physical 
and psychological well-being of a minor;’”42 (2) “[t]he distribution of 
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically 
related to the sexual abuse of children . . . . [because] the materials produced 
 
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual 
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.”  Id. at 418. 
 36. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (“These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply 
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated 
for all 50 States in a single formulation . . . .”). 
 37. Id. at 31. 
 38. Id. at 34. 
 39. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).  In Free Speech Coalition, there was 
substantial debate regarding the reach of Ferber.  The Government read the case as extending 
beyond the protection of real children and suggested that the same considerations that persuaded 
the Court in Ferber to limit First Amendment protection of child pornography involving real 
children should apply to the “virtual” material covered by the CPPA.  Petitioner’s Brief at 15, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795).  In fact, the Government plainly 
stated in its Supreme Court brief that “Ferber did not hold that the government’s sole compelling 
interest is in regulating depictions involving real children.”  Id.  Alternatively, others read the 
Ferber holding as limited to protecting only real children who suffer harm because of their 
participation in the production of child pornography.  For example, the Free Speech Coalition 
argued that “Congress can ban child pornography only to the extent that the proscribed material 
portrays sexually explicit conduct by actual children.”  Respondent’s Brief at 2, Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795). 
 40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 750-51. 
 41. Id. at 756. 
 42. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 
(1982)). 
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are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child 
is exacerbated by their circulation,”43 (3) “advertising and selling of child 
pornography provide an economic motive for . . . the production of such 
materials,”44 and (4) “[t]he value of permitting live performances and 
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”45 
The Ferber Court explicitly rejected the respondent’s argument that the 
Miller obscenity standard should apply to child pornography.46  The Court 
maintained that the Miller standard did not adequately support the State’s 
“more compelling” interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation.47  
In reviewing pornography that involves the use of an actual child, a court 
should not consider the work as a whole and need not determine that the 
material appeals to the prurient interest or that the sexual conduct portrayed is 
patently offensive.48  Note, however, that the “serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value” prong of Miller49 remains intact for the purposes 
of child pornography after Ferber.50 
In sum, Ferber makes clear that child pornography involving the use of 
real children “bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children 
engaged in its production [and therefore,] . . . it is permissible to consider these 
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”51  Therefore, 
under Ferber, if a child was involved in the production of a sexually explicit 
image, that image receives no First Amendment protection even if the image 
would not be deemed obscene under the Miller three-prong test.52 
The Ferber Court, however, did provide the following guidance to 
legislators of future child pornography statutes: “Here the nature of the harm to 
be combated requires that the . . . offense be limited to works that visually 
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.”53  Further, the Court 
emphasized that “depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which 
 
 43. Id. at 759 (footnote omitted). 
 44. Id. at 761. 
 45. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. 
 46. Id. at 761.  The Court plainly stated, “We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller 
standard is a satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem.”  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 764-65. 
 49. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 50. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65; id. at 774 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (writing separately “to 
stress that the Court does not hold that New York must except ‘material with serious literary, 
scientific, or educational value,’ from its statute.” (citation omitted) (quoting majority opinion at 
766)). 
 51. Id. at 764. 
 52. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
 53. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (second emphasis added). 
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do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction 
of live performances, retains First Amendment protection.”54 
C. Post-Ferber Regulation of “Real” Child Pornography 
After Ferber, there is virtually no debate regarding the constitutionality of 
legislation that targets the use of real children engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct in the production of pornographic materials.55 
As a result, neither the Free Speech Coalition nor the other parties who 
challenged the constitutionality of the CPPA challenged the categories of 
speech prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) and (C).56  Section 2256(8)(A) 
prohibits any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct where “the 
production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”57  In addition, § 2256(8)(C) prohibits “visual 
depiction[s] [that] ha[ve] been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an 
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”58  This provision 
prohibits the computerized “morphing” of innocent images of actual children 
into sexually explicit depictions of the same children.59 
As previously noted, while the Ferber holding is clear regarding child 
pornography created using real children, there was significant debate in Free 
Speech Coalition about the Ferber holding as it applied to sexually explicit 
images that appear to depict children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.60 
III.  PAST FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY REGULATION 
Primarily concerned with the growth of multimillion-dollar child 
pornography and prostitution industries nationwide, Congress first addressed 
the issue of child pornography with the passage of the Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.61  The Act’s Senate Report noted that 
at the time, current law addressed only the sale, distribution, and importation of 
 
 54. Id. at 765. 
 55. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 651 (11th Cir. 1999) (“To the extent it defines 
‘child pornography’ as images of actual minors, the CPPA passes constitutional muster with room 
to spare.”). 
 56. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2002). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added).  Section 2256(1) defines a minor as any person 
younger than eighteen. 
 59. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 242 (“Although morphed images may fall within the 
definition of virtual child pornography, they implicate the interests of real children and are in that 
sense closer to the images in Ferber.”); see also Respondent’s Brief at 9, Free Speech Coalition, 
535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795). 
 60. See supra note 39. 
 61. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253); 
see S. REP. NO. 95-438, pt. II, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 40-41. 
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obscene materials and emphasized the importance of creating federal laws to 
deal directly with the abuse of children that results from their involvement in 
the production of pornographic materials.62  As a result, the Act prohibited the 
use of children younger than sixteen years old in the production of 
pornographic materials and made it a crime to knowingly distribute such 
images for commercial purposes.63 
Following the Ferber decision, Congress next responded by enacting the 
Child Protection Act of 1984,64 which eliminated the commercial purposes 
requirement of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 
1977, raised the age of a minor from sixteen to eighteen, and removed the 
requirement that the material be obscene within the meaning set forth in 
Miller.65  The impetus for the passage of this Act was Congress’s concern that 
child pornographers who distributed materials without any commercial motive 
were still ultimately causing harm to the children they used in the production 
of the pornographic material and were escaping liability under the statute by 
claiming that they had no commercial motivation.  Congress noted that “the 
harm to the child exists whether or not those who initiate or carry out the 
schemes are motivated by profit.”66 
In 1986, Congress passed the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 
1986,67 which made illegal any advertisement created by anyone who sought 
or offered to receive, exchange, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce any 
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.68  The Act 
also prohibited those seeking to buy child pornography or participate in the 
production of child pornography from publishing any notice or advertisement 
of their illegal intentions.69 
In the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988,70 
Congress further refined its laws regulating child pornography by requiring 
“[w]hoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other 
 
 62. S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5, 15 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 43, 53. 
 63. Id. at 15. 
 64. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254). 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493-94. 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493-94.  Note 
Congress’s focus on the harm to the actual child.  The House Report stated that the Act “would 
limit coverage under the Act to visual depiction of children engaged in explicit sex acts, rather 
than . . . written depictions . . . [because there is] an obscenity requirement in the case of written 
depictions.”  Id. at 5.  This demonstrates Congress’s focus on preventing the harm to the child 
who engages in the production of the material rather than on outside effects of the production and 
distribution of child pornography that did not involve the use of a child in its production. 
 67. Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)). 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 99-910, at 5-6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5955. 
 69. Id. at 6. 
 70. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2251(c), 2252(a), 2256, 2257). 
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matter which . . . contains one or more visual depictions . . . of actual sexually 
explicit conduct . . . shipped in interstate or foreign commerce . . . [to] create 
and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer 
portrayed in such a visual depiction.”71  The Act also made illegal the use of a 
computer to transport, distribute, or receive child pornography.72 
The Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 
prohibited the knowing sale of images of children engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct and prohibited the possession of such images with the intent to sell 
them.73  The Act also prohibited the knowing possession of three or more 
depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.74  This provision 
was Congress’s reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne v. Ohio,75 
where the Court found that the child pornography market was largely 
underground and noted that legislation aimed only at the production and 
distribution of child pornography did little to curb the developing underground 
market for child pornography.76  Additionally, the Court found that “evidence 
suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into 
sexual activity.”77 The Court encouraged the passage of laws that would fuel 
the destruction of materials created using actual children.78 
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was one of Congress’s 
earliest forays into the regulation of virtual child pornography.79  Concerned 
with the growing use of then-advanced computer and photographic 
technologies to produce real and virtual child pornography, Congress passed 
the CPPA to criminalize the production, distribution, possession, sale, or 
 
 71. Id. § 7513, 102 Stat. at 4487. 
 72. Id. § 7511, 102 Stat. at 4485; see also Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual 
Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439, 451 (1997) 
(explaining that Congress criminalized the use of a computer “to transport, distribute, or receive 
child pornography” to combat the growing use of computer networks in the child pornography 
market). 
 73. Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, § 323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Burke, supra note 72, at 451. 
 76. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990). 
 77. Id. at 111. 
 78. Id. (“[E]ncouraging the destruction of these materials is . . . desirable because evidence 
suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”). 
 79. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-26; see Wade T. Anderson, Criminalizing “Virtual” Child Pornography Under the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act: Is it Really What it “Appears to Be?,” 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 393, 
397 (2001) (explaining that after the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, 
the CPPA was Congress’s “next significant step in addressing the power of computers to supply 
the child-porn market”). 
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viewing of both real and virtual child pornography.80  Specifically, the 
Congressional findings accompanying the CPPA noted that new technologies 
“make it possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual 
depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct 
that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from 
unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.”81  Further, the Senate’s findings emphasized the danger of 
child pornographers’ computer alteration of sexually explicit images so that it 
becomes impossible to detect if the images were created using actual 
children.82 
The Congressional findings also focused on the negative secondary effects 
of both real and virtual child pornography and maintained that harm occurs to a 
child viewing a sexually explicit image whether or not the child depicted in the 
image is real or “virtually indistinguishable” from a real child.83  In sum, this 
component of the CPPA’s rationale is based primarily on the idea that child 
abusers who use a computer-generated image of a child engaging in sexual 
conduct to seduce a real child into engaging in sexual conduct should not go 
unpunished.84  In this context, any distinction between images that portray 
actual children and images of computer-generated children involves a “mere 
technicality”85 as the damaging influence on the real child is the same no 
matter how the image was created. 
To target these evils, Congress expanded the definition of child 
pornography to include two new categories of prohibited speech in 18 U.S.C. § 
2256.  First, § 2256(8)(B) prohibited visual depictions of sexually explicit 
conduct where “such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct.”86  Second, § 2256(8)(D) prohibited anyone from 
advertising, promoting, presenting, describing, or distributing visual depictions 
 
 80. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(13). The CPPA “addresses the 
problem of ‘high-tech kiddie porn’ by creating a comprehensive statutory definition of the term 
‘child pornography’ to include material produced using children engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct [and] computer-generated depictions which are, or appear to be, of minors engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”  S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. I, at 7 (1996). 
 81. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(5). 
 82. Id. § 121(1)(6). 
 83. Id. § 121(1)(9); see also S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. III, at 8 (1996) (“The effect of such 
child pornography . . . on a child shown such material as a means of seducing the child into 
sexual activity, is the same whether the material is photographic or computer-generated 
depictions of child sexual activity.”). 
 84. S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. I, at 7 (1996) (“[T]he development of computer technology 
capable of producing child pornographic depictions virtually indistinguishable from photographic 
depictions of actual children threatens the Federal Government’s ability to protect children from 
sexual exploitation . . . .”). 
 85. Solowey, supra note 23, at 178. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000). 
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of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct in a manner that “conveys the 
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”87 
The effect of Congress’s expansion of the definition of child pornography 
in the CPPA was to create new categories of forbidden speech under the 
Court’s broad prohibition of child pornography articulated in Ferber.88  It was 
these two provisions that were specifically challenged in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition.89 
IV.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION 
DECISION 
A. The Circuit Split 
Before the Supreme Court heard Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, five 
circuits passed on the issue of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(B) and 
(D).  Of the five circuits, four upheld the provisions as constitutional and one 
did not. 
One of the first circuit cases was United States v. Hilton, where the First 
Circuit reversed the District Court for the District of Maine and held the CPPA 
to be constitutional.90  At issue in Hilton was the constitutionality of § 
2256(8)(B)’s prohibition of sexually explicit images that “appear to be a 
minor” engaging in sexually explicit conduct.91  Hilton was indicted by a grand 
jury for the criminal possession of computer disks that contained three or more 
images of child pornography in violation of § 2252A(5)(b).92  In Hilton, the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals boiled down the issue of the provision’s 
constitutionality into four main “lessons.”93  First, the court held that material 
that appears to depict a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct must be 
 
 87. Id. § 2256(8)(D), repealed by PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(a)(3), 117 
Stat. 650, 678. 
 88. John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of 
Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child Pornography Cases, 
30 N. KY. L. REV. 205, 210-11 (2003). 
 89. 535 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2002). 
 90. U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 91. Id. at 65, 75. 
 92. Id. at 67.  Section 2252A(5)(b) prohibits: 
[The knowing possession of] any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer 
disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been 
mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, 
including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer. 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(5)(b) (2000). 
 93. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 70. 
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afforded some level of constitutional protection.94  Second, the court held that 
acceptable governmental objectives regarding child pornography included 
more than the protection of actual children.95  Efforts aimed at stamping out 
the child pornography market, preventing the possession and viewing of 
pornographic materials involving children, and ending the use of child 
pornography to seduce children into the production of pornographic materials 
were all held to be legitimate Congressional objectives.96  Third, the court 
emphasized the importance of carefully describing “the type of condemned 
sexual depiction.”97  Finally, the court held that, because these regulations 
were aimed at protecting children, greater discretion and leeway ought to be 
given to state legislatures and Congress “to set out the parameters of anti-
pornography restrictions.”98 
The Hilton court focused on what the proper interpretation of the “appears 
to be” standard should be and, relying on the legislative record before the 
passage of the Act, held that the phrase “appears to be” was synonymous with 
visual depictions that were “‘virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting 
viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children engaging in identical 
sexual conduct.’”99 
Further, the Hilton court held that the CPPA included a built-in objective 
standard by which a jury would be required to make its ultimate determination 
of guilt under the statute.100  “A jury must decide, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting viewer would consider the 
depiction to be of an actual individual under the age of 18 engaged in sexual 
activity.”101 
In sum, the Hilton court refused to second-guess Congress’s findings 
regarding the dangers associated with virtual child pornography and held that 
 
 94. Id.  The court argued that sexually explicit material falls along “a constitutional 
continuum” that entitles sexually explicit speech to “varying degrees of protection.”  Id.  For 
example, non-obscene images of actual adults engaging in sexual activity receive full 
constitutional protection while images of real children involved in sexual activity receive no 
constitutional protection.  Id.  Images that “appear[] to depict an actual minor . . . arguably fall[] 
somewhere in between.”  Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  The court stated that “concerns about how adults may use child pornography vis-à-
vis children and how children might behave after viewing it legitimately inform legislators’ 
collective decision to ban this material.” Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 70. 
 99. Id. at 72 (quoting  S. REP. NO. 104-358, pt. IV(B), at 15 (1996)).  Unfortunately, the 
Court muddled the rearticulated standard by stating that the “appears to be” language really 
applies to “a specific subset of visual images—those which are easily mistaken for that of real 
children.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 75. 
 101. Id. 
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the government’s interest in regulating virtual child pornography was just as 
compelling as the government’s interest in regulating child pornography 
created using actual children.102 
The next circuit to consider the constitutionality of the CPPA was the 
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Acheson, which involved a defendant who 
was found to have downloaded more than five hundred images of child 
pornography from the Internet.103  Once again, the defendant in this case 
challenged the “appears to be” language of the CPPA and maintained that the 
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, unconstitutionally vague, and in 
violation of the First Amendment.104 
Noting the CPPA’s minimal overbreadth,105 the Acheson court held that the 
CPPA worked to eliminate child pornography and protected children from 
sexual exploitation.106  The court relied on the legislative record of the CPPA 
and took into account the nature of surrounding provisions of the statute to find 
that the “CPPA rests on solid footing” regardless of whether or not the material 
contains a depiction of an actual child or of a computer-generated image of a 
child.107 
To support its view that the statute was constitutionally sound, the court 
pointed to the affirmative defense provided in § 2252A(c), which allowed the 
defendant to assert that he or she used actual adults who were adults at the time 
of the production in the sexually explicit material.108  The court was also 
comforted by the burden imposed on the Government to prove that the 
defendant “knowingly” possessed the child pornography.109 
In the end, the court held that, despite the “legitimate sweep of the 
CPPA[,] . . . the demand driving the child pornography market is primarily for 
images falling far from any constitutional protection [and concluded that] the 
legitimate scope of the statute dwarfs the risk of impermissible 
applications.”110 
In United States v. Mento,111 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a 
new variation on the constitutionality challenges advanced in Hilton and 
Acheson.  In Mento, the defendant was convicted of downloading from the 
 
 102. Id. at 73. 
 103. U.S. v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 648 (11th Cir. 1999).  In this case, the defendant did not 
deny that the downloaded images involved real children.  Id. at 648 n.1. 
 104. Id. at 649. 
 105. Id. at 650-51 (stating that “[t]he CPPA’s overbreadth is minimal when viewed in light of 
its plainly legitimate sweep”). 
 106. Id. at 649. 
 107. Id. at 651. 
 108. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 652. 
 111. 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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Internet more than one hundred images of children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.112  The defendant maintained that the real goal of the CPPA 
was to eliminate certain ideas that Congress felt were particularly evil rather 
than preventing harm that occurs to children as a result of their participation in 
or exposure to child pornography.113 
The court in Mento interpreted the Ferber decision to include within 
Congress’s legitimate legislative reach the secondary effects of child 
pornography and stated that “[t]he government instead aspires to shield all 
children from sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography, and that 
interest is indeed compelling.”114 
Noting that the CPPA prohibited material that could be predominately the 
product of a person’s imagination, the Court nonetheless held that virtual 
depictions of child pornography had little, if any, redeeming social value and 
therefore did not deserve the protections of the First Amendment.115  Further, 
the Court held that the “appears to be” language implied an objective standard 
by which the fact finder was to make its determination of guilt or innocence 
under the statute.116  “[I]t would be the jury’s responsibility to ensure that a 
reasonable person would understand the specific impression sought to be 
conveyed.”117 
Finally, in May 2001, in United States v. Fox, the Fifth Circuit also 
addressed the constitutionality of the “appears to be” language in the CPPA.118  
In Fox, the defendant was convicted of knowingly receiving child pornography 
via his computer.119  The Fox court first addressed the issue of whether or not 
Congress had articulated a compelling interest in regulating images that appear 
to be of children engaging in sexual activity.120  Pointing to the familiar 
secondary effects rationale,121 the court concluded that the Ferber and Osborne 
decisions, taken together, demonstrated that the Government’s interests 
extended beyond protecting only the children who engage in the production of 
 
 112. Id. at 915. 
 113. Id. at 919. 
 114. Id. at 920. 
 115. Id. at 921. (“[T]he Act prohibits material that is predominantly the product of the 
creator’s imagination . . . . Nevertheless, artificial depictions of child pornography that cannot be 
easily distinguished from the real thing do not deserve the protections of the First 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 116. Mento, 231 F.3d at 922. 
 117. Id. 
 118. U.S. v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 119. Id. at 398. 
 120. Id. at 400. 
 121. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for an explanation of the secondary effects 
theory. 
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the pornography.122  “It makes little difference to the children coerced by such 
materials, or to the adult who employs them to lure children into sexual 
activity, whether the subjects depicted are actual children or computer 
simulations of children.”123  The Fox court stayed in line with the holdings of 
the First, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, and held that the “appears to be” 
language appropriately regulated the dangers associated with virtual child 
pornography.124 
Further, the Fox court emphasized the availability of the statute’s 
affirmative defense for improperly charged defendants and noted the 
difficulties of proving that an image contains a real child.125  In addition, the 
court held that the “appears to be” language was not overbroad and would not 
capture a substantial amount of otherwise-protected speech because it was 
clear from the statute that “Congress intended the ‘appears to be’ language of 
the statute to target only those images that are ‘virtually indistinguishable to 
unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children.’”126  
Ultimately, the Fox court was unconcerned about those images that fell on the 
fringes of the statute and held that the answer was not “invalidating the statute 
but rather [engaging in] ‘case-by-case analysis of the fact situations.’”127 
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
Sandwiched between the Eleventh Circuit’s Acheson opinion and the 
Fourth Circuit’s Mento decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
sharply diverged from the views of its fellow circuits in Free Speech Coalition 
v. Reno and held that the contested provisions of the CPPA were 
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and not in line with established First 
Amendment jurisprudence.128  The categories of speech at issue in the case 
were the same as those addressed in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh 
 
 122. Fox, 248 F.3d at 401.  (“We respectfully disagree . . . that preventing harm to children 
actually depicted in pornography is the only legitimate justification for Congress’s criminalizing 
the possession of child pornography.”). 
 123. Id. at 402. 
 124. Id. at 407. 
 125. Id. at 403. 
 126. Id. at 405 (quoting U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
104-358, at 7 (1996))) (emphasis added by Fox court). 
 127. Fox, 248 F.3d at 406 (second set of internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973)).  The court created its own example of art that might 
fall on the margin of the statute by referring to photorealism, an artistic method that involves a 
painted replication of a printed photograph.  Id. 
 128. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).  The Ninth Circuit 
was the only circuit to hold that the CPPA was unconstitutional.  See Fox, 248 F.3d 394; United 
States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).  See supra Part IV.A for a discussion 
of these cases. 
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Circuit opinions—the “appears to be” language of § 2256(8)(B)129 and the 
“conveys the impression that” language of § 2256(8)(D).130 
The court acknowledged the compelling interests of curbing child 
pornography using real children, but refused to hold that Ferber extended 
beyond the protection of real children.131  As a result, the court summarily 
rejected Congress’s secondary effects rationale and held that “Congress has no 
compelling interest in regulating sexually explicit materials that do not contain 
visual images of actual children.”132 
In two telling footnotes, the court defended its position by stating that “the 
critical fault in the secondary effects analysis . . . [is that it] shifts the argument 
focus from whether the questioned speech or images are constitutionally 
protected to a focus on how the speech or image affects those who hear it or 
see it.”133  The court further explained its position as follows: “Many innocent 
things can entice children into immoral or offensive behavior, but that reality 
does not create a constitutional power in the Congress to regulate otherwise 
innocent behavior.”134 
In addition, the court relied on American Booksellers Association v. 
Hudnut as supporting precedent for its decision.135  At issue in Hudnut was a 
city ordinance that prohibited pornography that portrayed women as 
subordinates or showed women in submissive and degrading ways.136  The 
Hudnut court invalidated the ordinance and held that while “[d]epictions of 
subordination tend to perpetuate subordination . . . [i]f the fact that speech 
plays a role in a process of [mind] conditioning were enough to permit 
governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech.”137 
Obviously concerned about criminalizing images created entirely by the 
imagination, the Reno court concluded that “[b]ecause the 1996 Act attempts 
to criminalize disavowed impulses of the mind, manifested in illicit creative 
acts[,] . . . censorship through the enactment of criminal laws intended to 
control an evil idea cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of the First 
Amendment.”138 
 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000). 
 130. Id. § 2256(8)(D), repealed by PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(a)(3), 117 
Stat. 650, 678. 
 131. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1092 (“Nothing in Ferber can be said to justify the regulation of such 
materials other than the protection of the actual children used in the production of child 
pornography.”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1092 n.6. 
 134. Id. at 1094 n.7. 
 135. Id. at 1093 (citing Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 136. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328. 
 137. Id. at 329-30. 
 138. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1094. 
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Ultimately, the Court held that the phrases “appear to be” and “conveys the 
impression that” were unconstitutionally vague because they provided no clear 
standard by which to determine if something “appears to be” or “conveys the 
impression” of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct.139 
C. The Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition Decision 
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Free Speech Coalition v. Reno decision 
to determine the constitutionality of the CPPA.140 
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court and held 
that: (1) “[T]he CPPA prohibits speech . . . [that may have] serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value;”141 (2) “the CPPA prohibits speech that 
records no crime and creates no victims by its production;”142 (3) the 
affirmative defense provided in the CPPA is “incomplete and insufficient,”143 
and (4) § 2256(8)(D) is overbroad because the provision does not consider the 
content of the material being pandered and therefore “the CPPA does more 
than prohibit pandering.  It prohibits possession of material described, or 
pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution 
chain.”144 
1. CPPA Prohibits Speech that May Have Serious Value 
At the core of the Supreme Court’s concern with the CPPA was its effect 
of chilling speech that may have “serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”145  The Court focused on the valuable role that literary 
themes such as teenage sexuality and the sexual abuse of children have played 
in our society for ages.146  In fact, the Court warned that: 
Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative 
years . . . . If these films . . . explore those subjects [or] contain a single graphic 
depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the 
film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work’s 
 
 139. Id. at 1095 (“The phrases provide no measure to guide an ordinarily intelligent person 
about prohibited conduct and any such person could not be reasonably certain about whose 
perspective defines the appearance of a minor, or whose impression that a minor is involved leads 
to criminal prosecution.”). 
 140. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“The principal question to 
be resolved, then, is whether the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe 
of speech that it neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography under Ferber.”). 
 141. Id. at 246. 
 142. Id. at 250. 
 143. Id. at 256. 
 144. Id. at 258. 
 145. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246. 
 146. Id. at 247-48. 
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redeeming value.  This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: 
The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single 
explicit scene.147 
To further demonstrate its concern with the limitations imposed by the 
CPPA, the Court mentioned such movies as “Traffic” and “American Beauty,” 
and speculated that these films would probably be in violation of the CPPA 
because they contain images that arguably “appear to be” minors engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.148 
2. The CPPA Prohibits Speech that Records No Crime and Creates No 
Victims 
In Free Speech Coalition, the Government argued that Congress could 
legitimately regulate virtual child pornography because child pornographers 
and child molesters might use the images to seduce future victims,149 that 
virtual child pornography “whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages 
them to engage in illegal conduct,”150 and the Government has an interest in 
curbing virtual child pornography because it has become a near-substitute for 
real child pornography and thereby fuels the child pornography market.151 
The Court rejected the Government’s secondary effects and market 
proliferation arguments and held that the causal link between virtual child 
pornography and subsequent instances of child abuse was “contingent and 
indirect” and “depend[ed] on some unquantified potential for subsequent 
criminal acts.”152  This holding is anchored in the Court’s critical finding that 
Ferber’s focus was to prohibit child pornography made using actual children 
in its production.153  Further, regarding the argument that virtual child 
pornography “whets the appetites” of child abusers to engage in criminal 
activity, the Court held that “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage 
unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”154 
The Court also held that Ferber did not hold that all child pornography is 
inherently without value.155  In fact, the Court held that Ferber explicitly relied 
 
 147. Id. at 248. 
 148. Id. at 247-48. 
 149. Id. at 251. 
 150. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253. 
 151. Id. at 254. 
 152. Id. at 250. 
 153. Id. at 250-51 (“Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was based upon how it was 
made, not on what it communicated.  The case reaffirmed that where the speech is neither 
obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 154. Id. at 253. 
 155. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 251. 
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on the distinction between pornographic images produced using real children 
and those that did not to support its holding.156 
In response to the Government’s argument that virtual child pornography 
had become a near-substitute in the “real” child pornography market, the Court 
flatly disagreed and held that if the Government’s contention were true, then 
potentially “legal” virtual images would have taken over the market long ago 
and would have driven out the illegal images of real children.157  Any sensible 
child pornographer, the Court hypothesized, would have forgone the risk of 
creating illegal images using real children and simply created computer-
generated images.158 
3. The Affirmative Defense is Incomplete and Insufficient 
The Government argued that prosecuting child pornographers who use real 
children in their material had become increasingly difficult because of the 
possibility that an image might have been computer-generated.159  The 
Government warned that even experts might not be able to discern whether or 
not a real child has been used in an image.160  Therefore, the Government 
reasoned that the best solution to this prosecutorial problem was to prevent 
both virtual and real images of child pornography and provide defendants with 
an affirmative defense that allowed them to show that the material was created 
using only adults.161  The Court disagreed with the Government’s solution and 
held that  “[p]rotected speech does not become unprotected merely because it 
resembles [unprotected speech].”162 
The Court held that the CPPA’s affirmative defense was “incomplete and 
insufficient”163 for two reasons.  First, the affirmative defense did not apply 
when the defendant faced a possession charge,164 and second, the affirmative 
defense did not provide protection to defendants who “us[ed] computer 
imaging, or through other means that [did] not involve the use of adult actors 
who appear to be minors.”165 
While the Court confirmed that the particular affirmative defense in the 
CPPA was incomplete and insufficient, the Court left open the possibility that 
 
 156. Id. (“‘[I]f it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age 
who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 
(1982)). 
 157. Id. at 254. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254. 
 161. Id. at 254-55. 
 162. Id. at 255. 
 163. Id. at 256. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256. 
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the CPPA could have been saved by a more complete and sufficient 
affirmative defense.166 
4. Section 2256(8)(D) is Overbroad 
The Court’s primary concern with the pandering provision of the CPPA 
was that it did not require an inquiry into the actual content of the image that 
the defendant was accused of pandering; rather, a person violated § 2256(8)(D) 
merely by conveying the impression that a particular image was of a child 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.167  At bottom, the Court held that the 
First Amendment required a “more precise” restriction than that which was 
provided in § 2256(8)(D).168  Further, the Court stated that § 2256(8)(D) 
“prohibit[ed] possession of material described, or pandered, as child 
pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain.”169 
D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the Court’s holding reflects his concern 
that at some point in the near future, technology might exist to make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that child pornography was created using a 
real child.170  Justice Thomas was therefore concerned that the enforcement of 
existing child pornography laws might become practically impossible.171  He 
suggested that: 
The Government may well have a compelling interest in barring or otherwise 
regulating some narrow category of ‘lawful speech’ in order to enforce 
effectively laws against pornography made through the abuse of real 
children . . . . [A] more complete affirmative defense could save a statute’s 
constitutionality . . . [and thus] some regulation of virtual child pornography 
might be constitutional.172 
Justice O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part with the holding.  
She found that the “appears to be” language covered two types of images: (1) 
those that appear to be children because they are created using youthful-
looking adults, and (2) those that appear to be children because they are 
created using a computer.173  With this dichotomy in place, Justice O’Connor 
agreed that the statute’s ban on pornography created using youthful-looking 
 
 166. Id. (“Even if an affirmative defense can save a statute from First Amendment challenge, 
here the defense is incomplete and insufficient, even on its own terms.”). 
 167. Id. at 257 (“The determination turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is 
depicted.”). 
 168. Id. at 258. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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adults was unconstitutionally overbroad.174  However, she, along with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, did not agree with the majority that the 
statute’s ban on child pornography created using a computer (virtual child 
pornography) was overbroad.175 
Citing the overwhelming governmental interest in halting the activities of 
sexual offenders, the three Justices were persuaded by the Government’s 
arguments that virtual child pornography is used to “whet the appetites of child 
molesters” and to seduce children into engaging in sexually explicit conduct.176  
These Justices were also troubled that a child pornographer who uses real 
children to create sexually explicit images might successfully avoid 
prosecution by asserting a false but unverifiable claim that the images were 
computer-generated when they, in fact, were not.177 
These Justices also found that the language “appears to be”—as applied to 
virtual child pornography by Justice O’Connor and as applied across the board 
by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia—was best interpreted as meaning “‘virtually 
indistinguishable from’ . . . . [because] the narrowing interpretation avoids 
constitutional problems such as overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring.”178  
Central to this argument was the Justices’ assessment that the possible conflicts 
involved in deciding from whose perspective “virtually indistinguishable 
from” should be based would be minimal.179  Justice O’Connor stated, “This 
Court has never required ‘mathematical certainty’ or ‘meticulous specificity’ 
from the language of a statute.”180 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia 
noted that they would have upheld the statute in its entirety and said that a fair 
reading of the statute shows that its language does not unnecessarily prohibit 
the youthful-looking adult pornography that Justice O’Connor would have 
protected.181  The dissenting Justices were unconvinced by the Free Speech 
Coalition’s doomsday view of the CPPA’s effect on free speech: “[W]e should 
be loath to construe a statute as banning film portrayals of Shakespearian 
tragedies . . . . [T]he CPPA has been on the books, and has been enforced, 
 
 174. Id. at 262 (“The Court correctly concludes that the causal connection between 
pornographic images that ‘appear’ to include minors and actual child abuse is not strong enough 
to justify withdrawing First Amendment protection for such speech.”). 
 175. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 260, 265. 
 176. Id. at 263. 
 177. Id. at 263. 
 178. Id. at 264-65. 
 179. Id. at 265. 
 180. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). 
 181. Id. at 269, 273. 
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since 1996.  The chill felt by the Court has apparently never been felt by those 
who actually make movies.”182 
Regarding the “conveys the impression” language found in § 2256(8)(D), 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia maintained that a fair reading of the 
CPPA would reveal that § 2256(8)(D) only reaches the “‘sordid business of 
pandering.’”183 
V.  CONGRESS’ RESPONSE: THE PROTECT ACT 2003 
On April 30, 2002, the House introduced the Child Obscenity and 
Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 (COPPA 2002) in response to the Free 
Speech Coalition decision and later passed the COPPA 2002 on June 25, 
2002.184  A companion bill, Senate Bill 2511, was introduced in the Senate on 
May 14, 2002.185 
Fearing the COPPA 2002 might “be more concerned with making a public 
point than with making successful cases,”186 on May 15, 2002, the Senate 
introduced the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2002 (PROTECT Act 2002) and later passed this 
version of the PROTECT Act on November 14, 2002.187 
However earnest its efforts might have been at responding to the Free 
Speech Coalition decision, the 107th Congress faced the reality of a November 
election and the resulting “lame duck” session of an outgoing Congress.188  
Because the COPPA 2002 and the PROTECT Act 2002 were not identical, 
neither bill could be approved before Congress adjourned.189  As such, “[t]hese 
bills died with the demise of the 107th Congress.”190 
 
 182. Id. at 270-71 (citation omitted).  To bolster this point, the Justices noted that the films 
“Traffic” and “American Beauty” won their Academy Awards in 2001 and 2000, long after the 
enactment of the CPPA.  Id. at 271. 
 183. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 
383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966)). 
 184. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002).  The COPPA 2002 was drafted by the Department of 
Justice and introduced to the House by Representative Lamar Smith.  148 Cong. Rec. H3880-81 
(daily ed. June 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy). 
 185. S. 2511, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 186. Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the Constitution: Hearing on 
S. 2520 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 145 (2002) [hereinafter Stopping 
Child Pornography] (statement of Vt. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 187. S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002).  This 2002 version of the PROTECT Act was introduced to 
the Senate by Senators Leahy and Orrin Hatch.  148 Cong. Rec. S11199 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 188. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. II, at 2 (2003). 
 189. Id. at 3. 
 190. Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of the PROTECT Act, 
21 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 4 (2003). 
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Almost immediately after convening, the 108th Congress began an effort 
to craft responsive legislation to the Free Speech Coalition decision.  On 
January 13, 2003, the Senate introduced the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools 
Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act 
2003),191 and on March 6, 2003, the House introduced the Child Obscenity and 
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003 (COPPA 2003).192  The COPPA 2003’s 
articulated purpose was to “prevent trafficking in child pornography and 
obscenity, to proscribe pandering and solicitation relating to visual depictions 
of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, [and] to prevent the use of 
child pornography and obscenity to facilitate crimes against children.”193  
Alternatively, the PROTECT Act 2003’s stated purpose is “to restore the 
government’s ability to prosecute child pornography offenses successfully.”194 
It should be noted that there was significant debate about key provisions in 
the COPPA 2003 and the PROTECT Act 2003.  To illustrate, after the House 
reviewed the Senate’s version, it offered an “amendment” to the Senate bill on 
March 27, 2003, which, in reality, was a recommendation that the Senate’s 
language be replaced in its entirety with the House’s version found in the 
COPPA 2003.195 
Despite ongoing disagreement, and presumably in the interest of the 
prompt passage of meaningful legislation, both houses compromised and 
passed the PROTECT Act 2003 on April 10, 2003.196  President George W. 
Bush signed the PROTECT Act 2003 on April 30, 2003, and stated that “[t]his 
important legislation gives law enforcement authorities valuable new tools to 
deter, detect, investigate, prosecute, and punish crimes against America’s 
children.”197 
But does it?  While it is hard to imagine anyone opposing Congress’s good 
intentions, the question regarding whether the PROTECT Act 2003 is 
meaningful and constitutionally viable remains.  In other words, what has 
Congress done differently this time to ensure that America’s children will not 
suffer another successful constitutional challenge to well-meaning but 
ineffective legislation? 
 
 191. S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 192. H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 193. Id. at pmbl. 
 194. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. I, at 1 (2003). 
 195. Compare House Amendment to S. 151, Title V, §§ 501-512 (March 27, 2003) with H.R. 
1161, 108 Cong. at §§ 1-14 (2003) (identical language).  See also Beard, supra note 190, at 4. 
 196. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 59 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 
694. 
 197. Statement on Signing the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 504 (April 30, 2003), 
reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 705, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/s043003bh.htm. 
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From the time immediately following Free Speech Coalition until the 
present, both the House and Senate have made clear that their desire is to 
respond to, not rehash, the problems identified by the Court in the Free Speech 
Coalition decision with regard to virtual child pornography regulation.  In fact, 
Senator Leahy made the following statement regarding the objectives for the 
PROTECT Act 2002: “The harder task is finding those kinds of legislative 
solutions that are not merely designed to be tough on child pornography in the 
short term, but can withstand the test of time and the scrutiny of the courts. . . . 
[T]he PROTECT Act . . . is a response to the [Free Speech Coalition] decision, 
not a challenge to it.”198  Supporters of the Protect Act 2003 argued that “[t]he 
last thing we want to do is to create years of legal limbo for our nation’s 
children . . . . Our children deserve more than a press conference on this issue.  
They deserve a law that will last rather than be stricken from the law books.”199 
While it remains to be seen how courts will handle future constitutional 
challenges to the PROTECT Act 2003, what follows is a look at this purported 
“response to the [Free Speech Coalition] decision.”200  This section presents an 
overview of Congress’s findings that accompanied the PROTECT Act 2003 
and highlights key provisions,201 including how the Act: (1) changes the 
definition of virtual child pornography; (2) changes the offense of pandering 
and solicitation of virtual child pornography, and (3) changes the affirmative 
defense.  Finally, this section will briefly analyze the PROTECT Act 2003’s 
constitutional viability in light of the Court’s decision in Free Speech 
Coalition. 
A. Congressional Findings Accompanying the PROTECT Act 2003 
As expected, the PROTECT Act 2003 cites a rapidly growing need to 
protect children from child molesters and child pornographers.202  It states that 
“technology already exists to disguise depictions of real children to make them 
unidentifiable and to make depictions of real children appear computer-
generated.  The technology will soon exist, if it does not already, to computer 
[-]generate realistic images of children.”203 
 
 198. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 1-2 (statement of Vt. Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 199. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 16 (2003). 
 200. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 2. 
 201. The PROTECT Act 2003 also adds two new crimes to the prosecutor’s toolbox in the 
fight against the exploitation of children.  See PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 
503(1)(D), 117 Stat. 650, 680; id. § 504, 117 Stat. at 681-82.  This Note will not analyze these 
sections. 
 202. Id. § 501(2), 117 Stat. at 676. 
 203. Id. § 501(5). 
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Notably, the PROTECT Act 2003 abandons the secondary effects and 
market proliferation rationales204 that accompanied the CPPA and instead 
emphasizes the perceived need to strengthen the Government’s ability to 
prosecute child pornography offenders.205 
Specifically, Congress warns that there is nothing to indicate that child 
pornography bought, sold, and possessed in today’s child pornography market 
is produced in any way other than through the use of an actual child.206  
Congress insists that many criminal defendants claim that the image in 
question is computer-generated, and therefore require that the Government 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the image is of a real child.207  
Apparently, some prosecutors feel this to be an insurmountable burden in some 
cases.  In fact, “prosecutors in various parts of the country have expressed 
concern about the continued viability of previously indicted cases as well as 
declined potentially meritorious prosecutions.”208 
For example, Congress highlights the fact that much of the child 
pornographic material circulating on the Internet involves retransmitted images 
that can be altered so as to make it impossible to determine if the depiction 
involves a real child.209  Congress warns that: 
[This technology creates] difficulties in enforcing the child pornography laws 
[that] will continue to grow increasingly worse.  The mere prospect that the 
technology exists to create composite or computer-generated depictions that 
are indistinguishable from depictions of real children will allow defendants 
who possess images of real children to escape prosecution; for it threatens to 
 
 204. Although the secondary effects and market proliferation justifications are not explicitly 
identified by the PROTECT Act 2003, one provision of the PROTECT Act 2003 is squarely 
aimed at criminalizing the use of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct to seduce children into engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  Id. § 503(1)(D).  
Interestingly, this provision prohibits the use of such images to persuade minors to engage in any 
illegal purpose.  Id.  For this reason, some speculate that this provision might be overbroad.  See 
Beard, supra note 190, at 6. 
 205. PROTECT Act 2003 § 501(9); see also Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 
62 (statement of Mr. Ernest E. Allen, Director, The National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children) (“[G]raphics software packages and computer animation are being used to manipulate 
or ‘morph’ images and to create ‘virtual’ images indistinguishable from photographic depictions 
of actual human beings. . . . [This] severely impairs the ability of law enforcement and 
prosecutors to protect children by enforcing existing laws prohibiting such crimes.”). 
 206. PROTECT Act 2003 § 501(7). 
 207. Id. § 501(7), (9). 
 208. Id. § 501(9).  But see Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 220.  Noting that the prosecutor’s 
perceived struggle might be exaggerated, Feldmeier states that, “of the 2091 child pornography 
cases initiated by the government between 1992 and 2000, only 10 defendants, regardless of the 
defense strategy they employed, were acquitted. . . . Even more telling is that none of these 
acquittals are reported as being based on the so-called ‘virtual child’ defense.”  Id. 
 209. PROTECT Act 2003 § 501(8). 
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create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer images even when a real 
child was abused.210 
In a hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel 
P. Collins testified that many experts are willing to testify to the uncertainty of 
whether an image was created using an actual child on behalf of defendants.211  
He forecasts that, without a change in the law, “[t]rials will increasingly 
devolve into jury-confusing battles of experts arguing over the method of 
generating an image that, to all appearances, looks like it is the real thing.”212 
What follows are key provisions from Congress’s effort to combat these 
perceived obstacles and to protect the nation’s children from sexual 
exploitation. 
B. How the Act Changes the Definition of Virtual Child Pornography 
The PROTECT Act 2003 heeds the Court’s warning in Free Speech 
Coalition regarding the unconstitutionality of the CPPA’s “appears to be” 
language found at § 2256(8)(B),213 and amends this section to read: 
“[C]hild pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph, 
film, video, picture, or computer, or computer-generated image or picture, 
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of 
sexually explicit conduct, where . . . 
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-
generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . .”214 
In addition, the PROTECT Act 2003 creates a special definition for 
“sexually explicit conduct” applicable to the newly amended § 2256(8)(B) by 
dividing § 2256(2) into subsection (A), which includes the previous definition 
of sexually explicit conduct,215 and subsection (B), which houses the following 
definition applicable only to § 2256(8)(B): 
“[S]exually explicit conduct” means— 
(i) graphic sexual intercourse . . . whether between persons of the same or 
opposite sex, or lascivious simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals, 
breast, or pubic area of any person is exhibited; 
 
 210. Id. § 501(13). 
 211. Hearing on H.R. 4623, supra note 21, at 4 (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). 
 214. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)) 
(emphasis added). 
 215. See PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(b), 117 Stat. 650, 676; 18 U.S.C. § 
2256(2) (2000). 
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(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated; 
(I) bestiality; 
(II) masturbation; or 
(III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or 
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area 
of any person[.]216 
The PROTECT Act 2003 adds to § 2256 to define “graphic” (as used in the 
new § 2256(2)(B)) and “indistinguishable” (as used in the amended § 
2256(8)(B)) as follows: 
(10) “[G]raphic,” when used with respect to a depiction of sexually explicit 
conduct, means that a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area 
of any depicted person or animal during any part of the time that the sexually 
explicit conduct is being depicted; . . . 
(11) ‘“[I]ndistinguishable” . . . means virtually indistinguishable, in that the 
depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude 
that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  
This definition does not apply to depictions that are drawings, cartoons, 
sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults.217 
First, regarding the changes to § 2256(8)(B), it would seem at first glance 
that the PROTECT Act 2003 follows the Court’s criticisms of the “appears to 
be” language in Free Speech Coalition.  Most notably, the definition now 
limits the images that fall within its purview to “digital image[s], computer 
image[s], or computer-generated image[s].”218  Further, the sexually explicit 
conduct depicted must be either graphic or lascivious,219 and the depiction 
must be “virtually indistinguishable” from an actual minor engaging in graphic 
or lascivious actual or simulated sexual conduct.220 
However, recall that the Court specifically stated that Ferber “reaffirmed 
that where the [child pornography] is neither obscene nor the product of sexual 
abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.”221  
Further, the Court stated, “Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by 
 
 216. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(B) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)) 
(emphasis added).  In addition, “lascivious” is defined as “tending to excite lust; lewd; indecent; 
obscene.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979). 
 217. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(10)-(11) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(10)-
(11)). 
 218. Id. § 2256(8)(B). 
 219. Id. § 2256(B)(i). 
 220. Id. § 2256(11). 
 221. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002). 
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definition without value.”222  While the PROTECT Act 2003 unquestionably 
narrows the definition of virtual child pornography, it is unclear whether these 
amendments sufficiently foreclose constitutional challenge.223 
To be sure, the Free Speech Coalition Court rejected the “virtually 
indistinguishable” rationale.224  As Professor Schauer noted in a statement 
about the PROTECT Act 2002 to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “no 
degree of indistinguishability in he [sic] image can create a real child where 
none existed before.”225  While § 2256(8)(B) explicitly protects drawings, 
cartoons, sculptures, and paintings,226 this provision might still prohibit speech 
that “records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”227  By 
allowing no consideration of whether the work contains serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value, the PROTECT Act 2003 could penalize 
the makers or possessors of films such as “Romeo and Juliet,” “American 
Beauty,” and “Traffic,”228 which all portray minors engaged in arguably 
sexually explicit conduct under the new § 2256(2)(B) definition of sexually 
explicit conduct.229 
While this provision of the PROTECT Act 2003 would capture what most 
communities would regard as objectionable virtual child pornography, it seems 
that an obscenity requirement would more safely narrow § 2256(8)(B).230  In 
 
 222. Id.  The Court was worried about the CPPA’s application to “a picture in a psychology 
manual, as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse. . . . Pictures of what appear to 
be 17-year-olds engaging in sexually explicit activity do not in every case contravene community 
standards.”  Id. at 246. 
 223. Beard, supra note 190, at 5. 
 224. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249-50; Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 
186, at 117 (statement of Professor Anne M. Coughlin, University of Virginia School of Law) 
(“Justice Kennedy noticed that the government sought to remedy [the “appears to be” language] 
in the CPPA by arguing that the prohibited speech was ‘virtually indistinguishable’ from the child 
porn that the government is free to regulate, and he disapproved this proposed understanding of 
the statute.”). 
 225. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 154 (statement of Professor Frederick 
Schauer, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). 
 226. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(11) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11)). 
 227. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250. 
 228. Recall that the Court expressed that these films might have fallen “within the wide 
sweep of the [CPPA’s] prohibitions.” Id. at 248. 
 229. Congress attempts to minimize this concern by stating that “[l]imiting the definition to 
digital, computer, or computer-generated images will help to exclude ordinary motion pictures 
from the coverage of ‘virtual child pornography.’”  H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 60 (2003), 
reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 695 (emphasis added).  Note, however, that many movies 
are viewed on DVD, and the term DVD stands for digital video disc.  In any event, it is difficult 
to understand why the medium used, whether it be digital, computer, film, or something else, 
would ultimately determine whether a work is protected by the First Amendment. 
 230. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Miller obscenity 
standard. 
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fact, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children advocates this 
view: 
[T]he vast majority (99-100%) of all child pornography would be found to be 
obscene by most judges and juries . . . [I]t is highly unlikely that any 
community would not find child pornography obscene. 
. . . 
  In the post-Free Speech decision legal climate the prosecution of child 
pornography cases under an obscenity approach is a reasonable strategy and 
sound policy.231 
It appears that Senators Leahy, Biden, and Feingold would agree with this 
approach as well: “The Supreme Court made it clear that we can only outlaw 
child pornography in two situations: one where it is obscene, or two, where it 
involves real kids.  That is the law . . . whether or not we agree with it.”232 
C. How the PROTECT Act 2003 Changes the Criminalization of Pandering 
and Solicitation 
The PROTECT Act 2003 completely eliminates 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D), 
the CPPA provision that defined child pornography as the advertisement, 
promotion, presentation, description, or distribution of any visual depiction in 
such a way that “conveys the impression that” the material contains a visual 
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.233  In Free Speech 
Coalition, the Court held that this provision was substantially overbroad and in 
violation of the First Amendment.234 
The new pandering and solicitation provision in the PROTECT Act 2003 
amends 18 U.S.C. § 2252A by breaking up § 2252A(3) into two subsections.  
The original provision remains at § 2252A(a)(3)(A), while the PROTECT Act 
2003 adds the following new pandering provision at § 2252A(a)(3)(B): 
(3) [Any person who] knowingly . . . 
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the 
mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the 
belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or 
purported material is, or contains— 
 
 231. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 28 (2003). 
 232. Id. at 27.  See also Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 220 (“[B]ecause a non-obscene image 
that is ‘indistinguishable’ from that of a minor . . . does not depict an actual child, it does not fall 
outside the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 233. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed by PROTECT Act 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 
502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678. 
 234. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002). 
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(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; or 
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.235 
In the PROTECT Act 2003’s Conference Report, Congress explains that 
“this provision prohibits an individual from offering to distribute anything that 
he specifically intends to cause a recipient to believe would be actual or 
obscene child pornography. . . . [and] prohibits an individual from soliciting 
what he believes to be actual or obscene child pornography.”236 
This section is troublesome for two reasons.  First, the “‘purported 
material’ [language] criminalizes speech even when there is no underlying 
material at all—whether obscene or non-obscene, virtual or real, child or 
adult.”237  This seems to be in direct contravention of the Court’s holding in 
Free Speech Coalition where it disapproved of the CPPA’s pandering 
provision because, under it: 
[C]ontent is irrelevant.  Even if a film contains no sexually explicit scenes 
involving minors, it could be treated as child pornography if the title and 
trailers convey the impression that the scenes would be found in the movie.  
The determination turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is 
depicted.238 
Recall that the Free Speech Coalition Court made it clear that visual depictions 
of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct might still be legal if the 
depiction has literary or other significant value.239 
Second, § 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii) potentially criminalizes the promotion of 
materials that are not obscene and do not involve the use of an actual child.240  
Arguably, this provision of the PROTECT Act 2003 would mean that “[a]ny 
person or movie theatre that presented films like Traffic, Romeo and Juliet, 
and American Beauty would be guilty of a felony. . . . The whole aim of 
dramatic presentation is to convince the viewer that what is, in fact, fiction is 
fact.”241 
 
 235. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(a)(3)(B)) (emphasis added). 
 236. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 61 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 695. 
 237. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 23 (2003).  One concern about the “purported material” 
language is that the provision might “federally criminalize talking dirty over the Internet or the 
telephone when the person never possesses any material at all.  That is speech, and that goes too 
far.”  Id. at 24. 
 238. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257. 
 239. See id. at 251; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-48 and 155-56. 
 240. See S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 24. 
 241. Id. 
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Further, the Free Speech Coalition Court required that the Government 
explain the evils posed by pandering images that simply “look like child 
pornography.”242  Notably, Congress has somewhat flimsily articulated a 
reason why the mere pandering of otherwise legal images should be prohibited.  
In the PROTECT Act 2003’s Conference Report, Congress mentions that 
“even fraudulent offers to buy or sell unprotected child pornography help to 
sustain the illegal market for this material.”243  This appears to be a 
resurrection of the market-deterrence theory advanced by the Government in 
Free Speech Coalition.244  The Court summarized and disposed of this 
argument as follows: “[I]t is said, virtual images promote the trafficking in 
works produced through the exploitation of real children.  The hypothesis is 
somewhat implausible.”245 
Once again, Congress has failed to articulate specifically how the 
pandering and solicitation of legal images fuels the market for illegal images 
of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  Put simply, in what way 
would a trailer for “Traffic,” “Romeo and Juliet,” or “American Beauty” fuel 
the market for images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct 
or obscene images of children (actual or real) engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct? 
Finally, it is important to note, the PROTECT Act 2003 does include an 
affirmative defense;246 however, § 2252A(c) excludes from its purview § 
2252A(a)(3)(B).  Congress explains that the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative 
defense is “comprehensive . . . for anyone charged with distributing or 
possessing child pornography . . . [but the PROTECT Act] ensure[s] [that] the 
defense does not apply to the pandering provisions.”247  As previously 
explained, § 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii) potentially criminalizes the promotion of 
materials that are not obscene and do not involve the use of an actual child.248  
As such, the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense can hardly be 
characterized as “comprehensive.” 
For these reasons, the pandering and solicitation provision of the 
PROTECT Act 2003 seems especially vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge.249 
 
 242. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257. 
 243. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 62 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 696. 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58. 
 245. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254. 
 246. See infra notes 251-66 and accompanying text. 
 247. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, title V, at 61 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 696. 
 248. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text. 
 249. S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. VIII, at 24 (2003) (“[T]he decision to obviate the need to 
demonstrate any relation to obscenity places the constitutionality of the provision as a whole at 
risk.”). 
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D. How the PROTECT Act 2003 Changes the Affirmative Defense 
The PROTECT Act 2003 provides the following amended affirmative 
defense to be codified at § 2252A(c): 
(c) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating paragraph (1), (2), 
(3)(A), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) that— 
  (1)(A) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person 
or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and 
  (B) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; 
or 
  (2) the alleged child pornography was not produced using any actual minor 
or minors. . . . 
A defendant may not assert an affirmative defense to a charge of violating 
paragraph (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) unless . . . the defendant 
provides the court and the United States with notice of the intent to assert such 
defense.250 
In Free Speech Coalition, the Court held that the affirmative defense 
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A of the CPPA251 was incomplete and insufficient 
and that it failed to protect a significant amount of lawful speech.252  
Specifically, Justice Kennedy held that the affirmative defense provided in the 
CPPA was “incomplete and insufficient”253 because the defense did not extend 
 
 250. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(c) (Supp. I 2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)). 
 251. This affirmative defense provided: 
It shall be an affirmative defense . . . that— 
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or persons 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and 
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material 
in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual depiction 
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). 
 252. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).  In a discussion about the 
insufficiency of the affirmative defense provided in the CPPA, the Court concluded, “Even if an 
affirmative defense can save a statute from First Amendment challenge, here the defense is 
incomplete and insufficient, even on its own terms.”  Id. 
 253. Id. 
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to possession offenses,254 nor did the defense protect defendants who could 
prove that the images in question were not produced using actual children.255 
In response to the Court’s concern that the affirmative defense failed to 
protect defendants who could prove that no child was used in the production of 
the material in question, the PROTECT Act 2003 now protects defendants in 
two situations: (1) when the alleged child pornography was produced using an 
actual person engaging in sexually explicit conduct and that person was an 
adult at the time of production,256 or (2) when the alleged child pornography 
was not produced using an actual minor.257 
Both scenarios seem to answer the majority’s immediate concerns 
regarding the ineffectiveness of the CPPA’s affirmative defense, but critics 
raise an important point: the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense 
arguably presupposes that a real child was used in the production of the 
image.258  Is it not the government’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the image is of an actual child? 
Some say the PROTECT Act 2003’s “relaxed definition of child 
pornography,”259 together with its affirmative defense, unfairly requires a 
defendant to “prove the government’s case.”260  Further, it is argued that the 
PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense “ignores the reality that most 
defendants lack the resources or the ability to prove that a ‘fictional’ character 
is not a real minor.  If the government . . . is purportedly having trouble . . . 
 
 254. Id. at 255-56 (“Where the defendant is not the producer of the work, he may have no 
way of establishing the identity, or even the existence, of the actors.  If the evidentiary issue is a 
serious problem for the Government, as it asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the innocent 
possessor.”).  The PROTECT Act 2003 explicitly extends the § 2252A(c) affirmative defense to 
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5).  PROTECT Act 2003 § 502(d), 117 Stat. at 679. 
 255. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.  The affirmative defense “allows persons to be 
convicted in some instances where they can prove children were not exploited in the production.” 
Id. 
 256. PROTECT Act 2003 § 502(d) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(1)(A)-(B)). 
 257. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2)).  See also Beard, supra note 190, at 5. 
 258. Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 223.  As Feldmeier noted: 
In essence, under Section 2252A(c)(1), all federal prosecutors must do in child 
pornography cases is prove that the charged material contains an image that is 
‘indistinguishable’ from that of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  Once this is 
done, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant who is then responsible for proving that 
the image is not of an actual child. 
Id. 
 259. Id. at 224.  See also Beard, supra note 190, at 5 (“[T]here remains the Supreme Court’s 
more general criticism that a criminal law that shifts the burden to the accused ‘raises serious 
constitutional difficulties.’”) (quoting Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255). 
 260. Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 224. 
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then how can criminal defendants, many of whom are indigent, be expected to 
do so?”261 
Others argue that the affirmative defense is fair and affords (at least for a 
producer-defendant) the opportunity to prove that adults were used in the 
material or that the material was made without the use of an actual minor.262  
After all, many of these defendants are hardly indigent; they presumably had 
the money for a fancy computer and software.  In support of a provision 
substantially similar to the one found in the PROTECT Act 2003, the Senate 
defended the affirmative defense by stating that “this provision places the 
burden of proof on the party that is in the best position to determine the 
pertinent facts.”263 
Finally, some support the PROTECT Act 2003’s affirmative defense on 
the ground that it is unreasonable to expect some prosecutors with limited 
access to sophisticated investigative tools to review every pornographic image 
involving children for evidence that a real child was used.264  Indeed, some feel 
that this task might be “overwhelming” for prosecutors.265 
Even assuming these perceived obstacles are real, it is difficult to imagine 
any scenario in which the American system of justice relieves, or even 
minimizes, a prosecutor’s burden because something is “too hard.”  The 
credibility of our American system of criminal justice relies upon the 
government marshalling sufficient evidence against a defendant so as to 
eliminate reasonable doubt in the minds of judges and juries.  Any other 
standard “undermine[s] and insult[s] the men and women serving as federal 
prosecutors who are more than capable of securing child pornography 
convictions without the assistance of dumbed-down evidentiary standards.”266 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While it remains to be seen whether the PROTECT Act 2003 will survive 
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, it is clear that Congress has made progress 
in crafting legislation that presents a more comprehensive solution to the child 
pornography problem. 
 
 261. Id. at 225.  Feldmeier further states that “it is patently unfair, unreasonable, and 
unconstitutional to afford the government a ‘close-enough’ standard in child pornography cases, 
while requiring defendants to demonstrate with precision the non-minor status of the person 
depicted.”  Id. 
 262. See S. REP. NO. 108-2, pt. III, at 8 (2003). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Robin Schmidt-Sandwick, Freedom of Speech: Supreme Court Strikes Down Two 
Provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), Leaving Virtual Child 
Pornography Virtually Unregulated, 79 N.D. L. REV. 175, 200 (2003) (proposing that prosecutors 
face significant challenges in mounting successful cases against child pornographers). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Feldmeier, supra note 88, at 228. 
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Despite the great debate that ensued while finalizing its legislative 
response to the Free Speech Coalition decision, one thing is certain: Congress 
is not willing to compromise in its mission to protect children from the evils of 
child pornography and child molestation.  Crafting legislation that both targets 
specific Congressional objectives and respects the speech freedoms guaranteed 
by the First Amendment will help secure the legislative protection that child 




 267. See Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 186, at 156 (statement of Professor 
Frederick Schauer, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). 
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